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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Susanne H. Ramadan brought a federal claim under the 
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 1601 et seq., and 
pendent state law claims against Chase Manhattan Corp. 
and Hyundai Motor Finance Co. alleging that she was given 
false financing disclosures when she purchased an 
automobile. The district court granted defendants' motion 
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. 




The essential facts are undisputed. On May 6, 1993, 
Ramadan purchased a 1990 Hyundai Excel automobile 
from Bob Ciasulli Hyundai, Inc., for $4,041.04. She also 
purchased an extended warranty contract for $998. 
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Ramadan financed the entire sum through a Retail Install 
Contract with Ciasulli. Ciasulli immediately assigned the 
loan to defendants Hyundai Motor Finance Co. and 
Chemical Bank, N.A.1 
 
Ramadan signed three copies of the Retail Install 
Contract. Each copy itemized the $998 charge for the 
warranty as being paid to a third party. This breakdown is 
mandated by 15 U.S.C. S 1638(a)(2)(B)(iii), which requires a 
creditor to disclose to a borrower "each amount that is or 
will be paid to third persons by the creditor on the 
consumer's behalf, together with an identification of or 
reference to the third person." Ramadan alleges that only a 
portion of the $998 charge for the warranty went to the 
third party to pay for the warranty, while Ciasulli pocketed 
the rest as a commission or finder's fee. Because of the 
inflated warranty charge, Ramadan alleges she overpaid for 
the warranty and paid additional interest on the 
commensurately inflated loan principal. 
 
Ramadan did not commence this action until August 2, 
1996. She claims that the inaccurate disclosure of amounts 
paid for the warranty violated the Truth in Lending Act 
("TILA"). Hyundai and Chase filed motions to dismiss under 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), arguing 
that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over the claim because Ramadan had filed her complaint 
after the applicable one-year time limit contained within 
TILA. See 15 U.S.C. S 1640(e). Ramadan contended that her 
complaint was timely because the limitation period was 
tolled during the time when the defendants concealed the 
true cost of the warranty. The district court granted the 
motion to dismiss solely under Rule 12(b)(1), finding that 
the one-year limitation period in S 1640(e) is a jurisdictional 
provision, and therefore not subject to equitable tolling. See 
Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 973 F. Supp. 456 
(D.N.J. 1997). Our review of federal jurisdiction is plenary. 
See Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 929 (3d Cir. 1996). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Chase Manhattan Corp. has since acquired Chemical Bank, the 
parent company of Chemical Bank, N.A., and has merged its auto 
financing division with Chemical Bank, N.A.'s. 
 




The sole issue on appeal is whether equitable principles 
can apply to toll the limitation period contained inS 1640(e) 
of TILA. The answer turns on a determination of whether 
the limitation period is jurisdictional or merely an ordinary 
statute of limitations engrafted upon a separate 
jurisdictional grant. A limitation period is not subject to 
equitable tolling if it is jurisdictional in nature. See, e.g., 
Shendock v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation, 893 
F.2d 1458, 1466-67 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
TILA requires lenders to make certain disclosures to 
borrowers and gives borrowers a civil cause of action 
against creditors who violate these disclosure provisions. 
See 15 U.S.C. S 1640. Subsection (e) grants jurisdiction 
over such claims to federal and state courts and imposes a 
one-year time limitation for bringing actions: 
 
       (e) Jurisdiction of courts; limitation on acti ons; 
       State attorney general enforcement 
 
        Any action under this section may be brought in any 
       United States district court, or in any other court of 
       competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date 
       of the occurrence of the violation. This subsection does 
       not bar a person from asserting a violation of this 
       subchapter in an action to collect the debt which was 
       brought more than one year from the date of the 
       occurrence of the violation as a matter of defense by 
       recoupment or set-off in such action, except as 
       otherwise provided by State law. 
 
Id. S 1640(e). 
 
The Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits 
have held that the statute of limitation under S 1640(e) is 
not jurisdictional and can be equitably tolled. See King v. 
California, 784 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones v. TransOhio 
Savings Ass'n, 747 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1984). The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, however, has 
indicated a contrary view in dicta. See Hardin v. City Title 
& Escrow Co., 797 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 
When determining whether a limitation period is 
jurisdictional, the Supreme Court has stated that while 
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several factors must be examined, the main purpose of the 
inquiry is to discover "whether congressional purpose is 
effectuated by tolling the statute of limitations in given 
circumstances." Burnett v. New York Central R.R. Co., 380 
U.S. 424, 427, 85 S. Ct. 1050, 1054 (1965). As we have 
previously recognized, "attachment of the label`jurisdiction' 
to a statute's filing requirements without examination of its 
language and structure, as well as the congressional policy 
underlying it, would be an abdication of our duty to 
interpret the language of a statute in accordance with 
Congress's intent in passing it." Shendock, 893 F.2d at 
1462; see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 
393, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1132 (1982); Burnett, 380 U.S. at 
427, 85 S. Ct. at 1054. 
 
The King and Jones decisions followed the analytical 
framework contained in Burnett. In Burnett, the plaintiff 
brought a timely claim against a railroad in state court 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. However, the 
plaintiff filed the action in the wrong venue, and his claim 
was dismissed. When the plaintiff refiled the claim eight 
days later in the proper federal court, it was dismissed 
again because the suit was filed after the three-year statute 
of limitation contained in 45 U.S.C. S 56 had passed. The 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal on the grounds that the time limitation was 
"substantive," not "procedural." The Supreme Court 
reversed and held that the timely filing in the state court 
tolled the statute of limitations as to the federal action. The 
Court stated, 
 
       The basic question to be answered in determining 
       whether . . . a statute of limitations is to be tolled, is 
       one "of legislative intent whether the right shall be 
       enforceable . . . after the prescribed time." 
       Classification of such a provision as "substantive" 
       rather than "procedural" does not determine whether 
       or under what circumstances the limitation period may 
       be extended. 
 
Burnett, 380 U.S. at 426-27, 85 S. Ct. at 1053-54 (citations 
and footnote omitted). To determine congressional intent, 
the Court looked to "the purposes and policies underlying 
the limitation provision, the Act itself, and the remedial 
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scheme developed for the enforcement of the rights given by 
the Act." Id. at 427, 85 S. Ct. at 1054. 
 
Based on the reasoning in Burnett, the Courts of Appeals 
in Jones and King held that equitable tolling would further 
the congressional purpose underlying TILA to "assure a 
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer 
will be able to compare more readily the various credit 
terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of 
credit." 15 U.S.C. S 1601. Those courts found that the time 
period was not jurisdictional and allowed the use of 
equitable principles to toll the limitations period in 
S 1640(e). 
 
In Jones, the court noted that several factors supported 
its conclusion. First, the court argued that TILA, as a 
remedial statute, should be construed liberally in favor of 
the consumer. See Jones, 747 F.2d at 1040. Second, the 
court noted that the remedial scheme of the Act was to 
create a system of private attorneys general and that, 
therefore, a technical reading would be "particularly 
inappropriate." Id. (citations omitted). Third, the court 
observed that S 1640(e) is not the sole provision granting 
jurisdiction to the district courts, but that it must be read 
together with 28 U.S.C. S 1337. Id. at 1040-41. The Jones 
court concluded that "[o]nly if Congress clearly manifests 
its intent to limit the federal court's jurisdiction will [the 
court] be precluded from addressing allegations of 
fraudulent concealment which by their very nature, and if 
true, serve to make compliance with the limitations period 
imposed by Congress an impossibility." Id. at 1041. 
 
This methodology is supported by the analysis used in a 
post-Burnett Supreme Court case, Zipes v. Trans World 
Airlines, 455 U.S. at 385. Zipes concerned alleged sex 
discrimination by TWA against female flight attendants. The 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that since the 
flight attendants had not filed a complaint with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission within the statutory 
time limit, and since that time limitation was a 
jurisdictional prerequisite, approximately ninety-two 
percent of the female flight attendants were barred from 
suing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that timely 
filing was not a jurisdictional prerequisite, "but a 
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requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to 
waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling." Zipes, 455 U.S. at 
393, 102 S. Ct. at 1132. Like the Court in Burnett, the 
Zipes Court examined several factors when making its 
determination. It looked to the structure of the act, the 
underlying policy of the act, and prior federal case law. Id. 




The purpose underlying TILA is "to assure meaningful 
disclosure of credit terms . . . and to protect the consumer 
against inaccurate and unfair" practices. 15 U.S.C. S 1601. 
Thus Congress enacted TILA to guard against the danger of 
unscrupulous lenders taking advantage of consumers 
through fraudulent or otherwise confusing practices. As the 
Burnett Court noted, the main inquiry is whether allowing 
tolling of the statute of limitations is consistent with this 
policy. We believe that it is. 
 
First, it must be noted that TILA is a remedial statute 
and should be construed liberally in favor of the consumer. 
See Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 
257, 262 (3d Cir. 1975). Allowing lenders to violate TILA, 
but avoid liability if they successfully concealed the 
violation from the debtor for a year, would undermine the 
core remedial purpose of TILA. As the Supreme Court 
recognized years ago, "[t]o hold that by concealing a fraud, 
or by committing a fraud in a manner that it concealed 
itself until such time as the party committing the fraud 
could plead the statute of limitations to protect it, is to 
make the law which was designed to prevent fraud the 
means by which it is made successful and secure." Bailey 
v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349 (1874) (applying 
equitable tolling to Bankruptcy Act of 1874). Disallowing 
equitable tolling in S 1640(e) would allow lenders to avoid 
liability through intentionally fraudulent actions using a 




The structure and language of the statute also provide 
insight into the intent of Congress. In Zipes, the Supreme 
Court's examination revealed that 
 
                                7 
  
       the provision granting district courts jurisdiction . . . 
       contain[ed] no reference to the timely-filing 
       requirement. The provision specifying the time forfiling 
       charges with the EEOC appear[ed] as an entirely 
       separate provision, and it [did] not speak in 
       jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the 
       jurisdiction of the district courts. 
 
Id. at 394, 102 S. Ct. at 1133 (footnotes omitted). Unlike in 
Zipes, the limitation here is contained in the same statutory 
provision as the grant of jurisdiction. In Burnett, the Court 
downplayed the importance of this distinction, stating, 
"[T]he fact that the right and limitation are written into the 
same statute does not indicate a legislative intent as to 
whether or when the statute of limitations should be tolled."2 
380 U.S. at 427 n.2, 85 S. Ct. at 1054 n.2. 
 
In Hardin v. City Title & Escrow, the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit determined whether a time 
limitation within the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
("RESPA") was jurisdictional in nature. The court examined 
S 1640(e) of TILA for comparison, concentrating on the 
language of the statute to discern the intent of Congress.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Burnett Court indicated that placing the time limitation in the 
same section as the jurisdictional grant may be important when dealing 
with choice of law. It stated, "the embodiment of a limitations provision 
in the statute creating the right which it modifies might conceivably 
indicate a legislative intent that the right and limitations be applied 
together when the right is sued upon in a foreign forum." Burnett, 380 
U.S. at 427 n.2, 85 S. Ct. at 1054 n.2. That is not the case here. 
 
3. The court in Hardin also engaged in a lengthy discussion of the 
legislative history of TILA. It pointed to the 1980 Amendments that 
added the recoupment and set-off exceptions to S 1640(e) as evidence 
that the provision was intended to be jurisdictional. The court argued 
that since defensive actions in recoupment are never barred by a statute 
of limitations, by amending the limitation to except these actions from 
the time limit, Congress must have been treating it as a jurisdictional 
limitation. Otherwise, the amendment would have been unnecessary. See 
Hardin, 797 F.2d at 1039-40 & n.4. In fact, it appears that whether 
defensive actions were barred or not was far from clear at the time of the 
amendments. The court in Kerby v. Mortgage Funding Corp., 992 F. 
Supp. 787, 796-97 (D. Md. 1998), presents a compelling 
counterargument to Hardin concerning the legitimacy of its analysis of 
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In doing so, the court concluded that "[b]ecause the time 
limitation . . . is an integral part of the same sentence that 
creates federal and state court jurisdiction, it is reasonable 
to conclude that Congress intended thereby to create a 
jurisdictional time limitation." Hardin, 797 F.2d at 1039. 
The court concluded that since "jurisdictional provisions in 
federal statutes are to be strictly construed, . . .[and 
w]here a time limitation is jurisdictional, it must be strictly 
construed and will not be tolled or extended on account of 
fraud[ulent concealment]." Id. at 1040. 
 
The Seventh Circuit recently declined to follow Hardin, 
concluding that it was inconsistent with Supreme Court 
precedent and the "particular[ly] relevan[t]" cases of Jones 
and King. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Dearborn Title Corp., 
118 F.3d 1157, 1166-1167 (7th Cir. 1997) (allowing 
equitable tolling in RESPA case); see also Kerby v. Mortgage 
Funding Corp., 992 F. Supp. 787 (D. Md. 1998) (allowing 
equitable tolling in RESPA and S 1640(e) case); Moll v. U.S. 
Life Title Ins. Co. of N.Y., 700 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(allowing equitable tolling in RESPA case). Indeed, as 
Lawyers Title indicated, although states are more likely to 
treat their statutes of limitations as jurisdictional, "periods 
of limitations in federal statutes . . . are universally 
regarded as nonjurisdictional. . . . Only rules limiting the 
commencement of actions against the United States have 
been given the `jurisdictional' treatment." Lawyers Title, 
118 F.3d at 1166. 
 
Appellee Chase also argues that by excluding recoupment 
and set-off claims from the operation of S 1640(e), Congress 
demonstrated its intention not to allow any other 
exceptions to the time period. We think Houghton v. 
Insurance Crime Prevention Institute, 795 F.2d 322 (3d Cir. 
1986), a case construing a very similar provision of the Fair 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the legislative history of the 1980 amendments. We will not rehash these 
arguments here, except to agree with Kerby that it appears that 
Congress enacted the 1980 amendments in response to conflicting 
applications of S 1640(e). This conclusion would be consistent with a 
reference, overlooked in Hardin, to the time limit as a "statute of 
limitation" in the legislative history of the 1980 amendment. S. Rep. No. 
96-368, at 32 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 268. 
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Credit Reporting Act, is instructive. The section at issue 
there provided in pertinent part: 
 
       An action to enforce any liability . . . may be brought 
       within two years from the date on which the liability 
       arises, except that where a defendant has materially 
       and willfully misrepresented any information required 
       under this subchapter to be disclosed to an individual 
       and the information so misrepresented is material to 
       the establishment of the defendant's liability to that 
       individual under this subchapter, the action may be 
       brought at any time within two years after discovery by 
       the individual of the misrepresentation. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1681p. In Houghton, we determined that the 
discovery rule, which tolls the running of statutes of 
limitation while a plaintiff is duly unaware of a violation did 
not apply to S 1681p. We noted that statutes of limitation, 
whether substantive or procedural, could be tolled by the 
discovery rule. See Houghton, 795 F.2d at 324-25. Citing 
Burnett, we reiterated our obligation to determine whether 
tolling was consistent with the congressional purpose. See 
id. at 325 (citing Burnett, 380 U.S. at 426, 85 S. Ct. at 
1053). We then concluded that since Congress explicitly 
provided for one exception to the statute of limitations, we 
would not presume the intent to allow others. See id. We 
did not construe the time period as jurisdictional. 
 
Chase points to the similarity between S 1640(e) and 
S 1681p to argue that Congress knew how to create 
equitable exceptions to the time period. By not doing so in 
S 1640(e), Chase asserts, Congress did not intend equitable 
tolling principles to apply. This argument, however, 
contradicts a well-established principle of law that equitable 
tolling doctrines are "read into every federal statute of 
limitation." Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-97, 
66 S. Ct. 582, 585 (1946). This strong presumption may 
only be rebutted if "Congress expressly provides to the 
contrary in clear and unambiguous language." Atlantic City 
Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236, 241 (2d Cir. 
1962). Therefore, by not explicitly limiting the allowable 
equitable tolling exceptions as they did in S 1681p, it is 
much more likely that Congress anticipated that courts 
would apply traditional equitable tolling principles as they 
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do in all other statutes where there is no explicit limitation 
to their application. 
 
Although the structure of S 1640(e) could support an 
argument that the time limitation is jurisdictional, when 
looked at in light of the underlying policy of TILA and case 
law, it becomes clear that the time limitation is not 
intended to operate jurisdictionally. If Congress had 
intended otherwise, they could have explicitly linked the 
expiration of jurisdiction to the expiration of the statute of 
limitation. They did not, therefore, we will read equitable 




Finally, the language and analysis of our prior case law 
is consistent with the conclusion that S 1640(e) is not a 
jurisdictional limitation but rather in the nature of a 
statute of limitations and amenable to tolling. 
 
In Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 896 
(3d Cir. 1988), the parties whose claims were asserted past 
the time limit did not argue for the application of any 
equitable tolling principles under TILA. We did, however, 
refer to the time limit in S 1640(e) as a "statute of 
limitation." Id. at 903 & n.6. While informative, this 
unexplained reference in dicta is by no means dispositive. 
In Zipes, the Supreme Court noted that its previous 
decisions describing the time limitation for filing EEOC 
charges as jurisdictional were not dispositive because the 
nature of the time limit was not at issue in those cases and 
other decisions had identified the provision as a statute of 
limitation. 
 
Our decision in Bartholomew v. Northampton National 
Bank of Easton, 584 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1978), provides 
more guidance. In Bartholomew, the plaintiff claimed that 
two equitable tolling doctrines applied. 584 F.2d 1288, 
1296-97 (3d Cir. 1978). We reviewed the record and held 
that there was "no arguable basis . . . for plaintiff's . . . 
contention" and that the facts did "not, as a matter of law, 
constitute such conduct that would estop the banks from 
raising the bar of the statute of limitations." Id. at 1297. 
Although we held that equitable tolling did not apply, the 
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simple fact that we analyzed whether equitable principles 
would apply is important. In Zipes, the Court buttressed its 
conclusion that the time limitation was not jurisdictional by 
noting that prior cases had actually reached the merits of 
arguments concerning whether the limitation period should 
be tolled. 455 U.S. at 397, 102 S. Ct. at 1134-35. The 
Court asserted that to pursue such an examination in the 
face of a jurisdictional prerequisite would have been 
"gratuitous." Id., 102 S. Ct. at 1134. It follows that if the 
time limitation is jurisdictional, we would not have 
examined the record in Bartholomew to determine whether 
a factual basis existed for the application of equitable 
tolling principles. That investigation would also have been 
"gratuitous" because even if a sufficient factual basis 




In Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank, 118 S. Ct. 1408 (1998), 
the Supreme Court held that the time limit for rescinding a 
loan transaction under a separate provision of TILA 
extinguishes the right itself, as opposed to the right to a 
remedy, and thus is not a typical statute of limitations. 
Although the Court did cite to Burnett, it did so to provide 
an example of a rule of statutory construction not actually 
utilized in Beach: "the creation of a right in the same 
statute that provides a limitation is some evidence that the 
right was meant to be limited, not just the remedy." Id. at 
1412. It observed that the " `ultimate question' is whether 
Congress intended that `the right shall be enforceable in 
any event after the prescribed time.' " Id. (quoting Midstate 
Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 320 U.S. 356, 
360, 64 S. Ct. 128, 130 (1943)). The Beach Court found its 
answer in the language of the statute itself. Section 1635 
states that "[an] obligor's right of rescission shall expire 
three years after the date of consummation of the 
transaction." 15 U.S.C. S 1635(f). The Court held that 
Congress had explicitly linked the right and the remedy in 
this section, and therefore the right to sue expired at the 
end of the period. As discussed above, that is not the case 
here. 
 




In sum, based on the structure and purpose of TILA, we 
hold that the statute of limitations contained in S 1640(e) is 
not jurisdictional and is therefore subject to equitable 
tolling. Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's order 
and remand the cause to the district court. 
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